he world _only_ by these
means, to the exclusion of everything like a "special Providence," or
"Divine influences." It is not so much in his dogmatic statements as in
his illustrative examples that the real tendency of his theory becomes
apparent. Thus he speaks of "the most pious and benevolent missionaries
sailing to civilize and Christianize the heathen, but, embarking in an
unsound ship, they are drowned by their disobeying a physical law,
without their destruction being averted by their morality;" and, on the
other hand, of "the greatest monsters of iniquity" embarking in a
staunch and strong ship, and escaping drowning "in circumstances exactly
similar to those which would send the missionaries to the bottom." Thus,
again, he speaks of plague, fever, and ague, as resulting from the
neglect of "organic laws," and as resulting from it so necessarily that
they could be averted neither by Providence nor by Prayer; and he
illustrates his views by the mental distress of the wife of Ebenezer
Erskine, and the recorded experience of Mrs. Hannah More.[197] It cannot
be doubted, we think, that in all these cases he speaks as if God
governed the world _only_ by natural laws; and that he does not
recognize any special Providence or any answer to Prayer, but resolves
all events into the operation of these "laws."
Now, there are evidently _two_ suppositions that may be entertained on
this subject: either, that God orders _all_ events to fall out according
to "natural laws" and by means of "second causes;" or, that while He
_generally_ makes use of means in the ordinary course of His Providence,
He reserves the liberty and the power of interposing directly and
immediately, when He sees cause, for the accomplishment of His sovereign
will. These two suppositions seem to exhaust the only possible
alternatives in a question of this kind; and, strange as it may at first
sight appear to be, it is nevertheless true that neither the one nor the
other is necessarily adverse to the doctrine for which we now contend.
Even on the first supposition,--that God orders _all_ events to fall out
according to "natural laws" and by means of "second causes,"--there
might still be room, not, indeed, for miraculous interposition, but for
the exercise of a special Providence and even for an answer to prayer;
for it should never be forgotten that, among the "second causes" created
and governed by the Supreme Will, there are other agencies besides those
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