a habit or frame of mind most favorable to the recognition of
God's Providence, and most conducive to our welfare, by impressing us
with a sense both of our _dependence_ on His supreme will, and of our
_duty to be diligent_ in the use of all appointed means. But when
_either_ of the two classes of events is exclusively considered, or the
sentiments appropriate to them inordinately cherished, there will be a
tendency, in the absence of an enlightened belief in Providence, towards
one or other of two opposite extremes:--the extreme, on the one hand, of
resolving all events into results of physical agencies and mechanical
laws, acting with the blind force of "destiny," and leaving no room for
the interposition of an intelligent Moral Ruler; and the extreme, on the
other hand, of ascribing all events to accidental or fortuitous
influences, equally exempt from His control. The _former_ is the theory
of "Fate," the _latter_ is the theory of "Chance;" and both are equally
opposed to the doctrine which affirms the eternal purpose and the actual
providence of an omniscient and all-controlling Mind.

It matters little, with reference to our present purpose, whether or not
every department of Nature be supposed to be equally subject to "natural
laws;" for even were it so, still if these laws were either in part
unknown and undiscoverable by us, or so related to each other that the
results of their manifold possible combinations could not be calculated
or reckoned on by human wisdom or foresight, ample room would be left
for the exercise of _diligence_ within the limits of our ascertained
knowledge, and yet for a sense of _dependence_ on a power which we feel
ourselves unable either to comprehend or control. On the ground of
analogy, we think it highly probable that every department of Nature
_is_ subject to regular and stable laws; and on the same ground we may
anticipate that, in the progressive advance of human knowledge, many new
fields will yet be conquered, and added to the domain of Science. But
suppose every law were discovered,--suppose, even, that every individual
event should be shown to depend on some natural cause, there would still
remain at least _two_ considerations which should remind us of our
_dependence_. The first is our ignorance of the whole combination of
causes which may at any time be brought into action, and of the results
which may flow from them in circumstances such as we can neither foresee
nor provide