concerned in the competition appeared before and after
it, showing how much the philosophical mind of France had been occupied
with this great theme, while in Britain it was attracting little or no
attention.

This is the most recent discussion, on a great scale, of the theory of
Certitude. But the question, far from being a new or modern speculation,
is as old as Philosophy itself, and has been perpetually reproduced in
every age of intellectual activity. Plato discusses it, chiefly in the
Theaetetus, Sophist, and Parmenides; it was agitated by Pyrrho,
Enesidemus, and Sextus Empiricus, with that peculiar subtlety which
belonged to the mind of Greece; and in more recent times it has
reappeared in the writings of Montaigne and Bayle, Huet and Pascal,
Glanville, Hume, and Kant. Even during the middle age, the controversy
between the Nominalists and Realists had an important bearing on this
subject: so that from the whole history of Philosophy we derive the
impression of its fundamental importance, an impression which is
deepened and confirmed by the transcendent interest of the themes to
which it has been applied.

In our present argument, we are concerned with it only so far as it
stands connected with the foundations of Theology, or as the right or
wrong solution of the general question might affect the evidence for the
Being and Perfections of God. We do not propose, therefore, to offer a
full exposition of the philosophy of Certitude, still less to institute
a detailed examination of the various theories which have been
propounded respecting it. It will be sufficient for our purpose if we
merely sketch a comprehensive outline of the subject, and select some of
the more prominent points which have the most direct bearing on the
grounds of our religious belief. Thus much may be accomplished by
considering, _first_, the statement of the problem, and, _secondly_, the
solution of it.

In regard to the _statement_ of the problem, it is necessary, in the
first instance, to ascertain its precise import, by determining the
meaning of the term Certitude. The programme of the Academy very
properly places this question on the foreground, Is Certitude the same
with the highest probability? And it is the more necessary to give
precedence to this part of the inquiry, because it is notorious that
there is a wide difference between the philosophical and the popular
sense of Certitude,--a difference which has often occasioned mutual