theory, again, which places the principle
of Certitude in EVIDENCE, admits of being exhibited in two very distinct
aspects. In the one, it has been treated as if Evidence were purely
_subjective_, as if it belonged exclusively to thought, and not to the
object of thought, or as if it depended solely on the perceptions of our
minds, and not at all on any objective reality which is independent of
them, and which is equally true whether it be perceived by our minds or
not. In this form it is a theory of Individualism, and has a strong
tendency towards Skepticism. In the other aspect, Evidence is regarded
as the sole and sufficient ground of Certitude, but it is viewed both
_objectively_ and _subjectively_;--_objectively_, as having its ground
and reason in a reality that is independent of our perceptions, and that
may or may not be perceived without being the less true or the less
certain in itself;--and yet _subjectively_ also, as being equally
dependent on certain principles of reason or laws of thought, without
which no external manifestation would suffice to create the ideas and
beliefs of the human mind, since the evidence which is exhibited
externally must not only exist, but must be perceived, discerned, and
appreciated, before it can generate belief: but when perceived, it
produces conviction, varying in different cases in degree, and amounting
in some to absolute certainty, which leaves no room either for denial or
doubt.

Such are the three grand theories of Certitude, and the several distinct
forms or phases in which they have severally appeared. We have no
hesitation in declaring our decided preference for the second form of
the third theory,--that which resolves the principle or ground of
Certitude into EVIDENCE; but EVIDENCE considered both _objectively_ and
_subjectively_,--_objectively_, as that which exists whether it is
perceived or not, and is independent of the caprices of individual
minds, and _subjectively_, as that which must be discerned before its
proper impression can be produced, which must be judged of according to
the laws of human thought, and which, when so discerned and judged of,
imparts a feeling of assurance which no sophistry can shake and no
philosophy strengthen.

According to some recent theories, Certitude belongs to our knowledge,
only because that knowledge is derived from a reason superior to our
own,--a reason not personal, but universal, not individual but generic,
which, alth