uidance of analogy, but on the sure ground of
induction. If we go beyond this, and insist that the designing cause
must be _in all respects_ like ourselves, that if we be organized, He
must be organized, that if we act by material organs He must act by the
same, we exceed the limits of legitimate reasoning, and enter on the
region of pure conjecture. But such conjectures, groundless as they are,
and revolting as every one must feel them to be, can have no effect in
shaking our confidence in the valid induction by which we infer from
marks of _design_ in nature the existence of a designing Cause.

It can scarcely be necessary to enlarge on the gratuitous assumptions on
which this _extension_ of the argument is made to rest;--such as that
"every person is organized," that "all power is a mere attribute of
matter," that "no man ever knew of thought distinct from an organization
in which it was _generated_." The only fragment of truth that can be
detected in these assumptions is the fact that we have, in our present
state, no experience of intelligence apart from the organization with
which it is here associated: but will this warrant the inference that
intelligence _cannot_ exist apart from organization, or that the one is
the mere product of the other? It may be a good and valid inference from
the marks of design in nature, that a designing cause must exist; for
this inference, although suggested by analogy, is founded on induction,
which requires a perfect resemblance only _in those respects_ on which
the inference depends. But to go beyond this, and to insist that the
designing cause must be organized, because we have _no experience_ of
intelligence apart from organization, is to make our experience the
measure of possible being, and to exclude, surely on very insufficient
grounds, all notion of purely spiritual personality. In "extending the
analogy beyond the Paley point," Mr. Holyoake is arguing from the
particular case of man to another case, which resembles it in some
respects, but may differ from it in others; and similar as they are in
the one point of living, designing intelligence, they may, for aught he
knows, differ in many other respects. And this we hold to be a
sufficient answer to his argument, especially when it is combined with
the consideration that the assumptions on which that argument is based
are purely gratuitous, namely, that "every person is organized," and
that there is no "thought distinct from