known to
agree in some one point; for otherwise they could not be referable to
any one class, and there would consequently be no basis to the
subsequent inference drawn in the conclusion. 2. That the conclusion
must be modified by a reference to the circumstances of the particular
_to_ which we argue. For herein consists _the essential distinction
between an analogical and an inductive argument_. Since, in an inductive
argument, we draw a general conclusion, we have no concern with the
circumstantial peculiarity of individual instances, but simply with
their abstract agreement. Whereas, on the contrary, in an analogical
argument, we draw a particular conclusion, we must enter into a
consideration of the circumstantial peculiarity of the individual
instance, in order to exhibit the conclusion in that particular form
which we would infer. Whence it follows, that whilst by induction we
obtain absolute conclusions, by analogy we can only arrive at relative
conclusions, or such as depend for their absolute and entire validity on
the coincidence of _all_ the circumstances of the particular inferred
with those of the particular from which the inference is drawn." Again:
"The circumstances _to_ which we reason may be considered of threefold
character. They are either known or unknown. If they are known, they are
either (1.) Such as we have no reason to think different, in any respect
from those under which our observations have been made; or (2.) Such as
differ in certain _known_ respects from these last. (3.) They are
unknown, where we reason concerning truths of which, from the state of
our present knowledge, from the nature of our faculties, or from the
accident of our situation as sojourners upon earth, we are totally
ignorant."[286]
With these necessary limitations, suggested by the different
circumstances in which analogy is applied, we shall have little
difficulty in disposing of Mr. Holyoake's _extension_ of Dr. Paley's
argument. Not content with resemblance _in some respects_, he requires a
sameness _in all_. He would exclude all dissimilarity, forgetting that
analogy denotes a certain relation between two or more things which in
other respects may be entirely different. We may see a resemblance
between the marks of design in nature and the ordinary effects of design
in art; and that perception of design gives rise to an intuitive
conviction or inductive inference of a designing cause: thus far we
proceed under the g
|