hatever way these convictions may
have been formed, and whether they were _true or false_? And could they
be reassured or comforted by any other article of the Secular Creed?
They might be told, as Mr. Holyoake tells them, "I am not an
unbeliever, if that implies the rejection of Christian truth, since all
I reject is Christian error:" I reject "the fall of man, the atonement,
the sin of unbelief, the doctrine of future punishment; a disbeliever in
all these doctrines, why should I fear to die?" But the more thoughtful
among them, all who were really in earnest, might desiderate something
more; they might see that _disbelief_, however dogmatic, does not amount
to _disproof_, and that the _real ground of fear_ is not in the least
removed by it. Does his question imply, that if these doctrines were
_true_, he would have just reason to fear death? or does it mean merely,
that whether they be true or false, he can have no reason to fear death,
simply because he _disbelieves_ them? On the former supposition, how
vast the difference between the Secularist and the Christian? The one
would have reason to fear because these doctrines are or may be true;
the other believes them to be true, and finds in that very belief a
deliverance from the fear of death, and a firm ground of confidence and
hope! On the latter supposition,--which we believe to be the correct
one,--what an amazing confidence must that man possess in the
_sincerity_ of his convictions, the _conscientiousness_ of his judgment,
and the rigid _impartiality_ of his inquiries after truth, who can peril
his eternal prospects on the mere fact that he _disbelieves_ these
doctrines, whether they be _true_ or _false!_ Suppose that disbelief may
diminish the intensity of his fears, can it alter the real state of the
case, or remove the only just ground of apprehension and anxiety in
regard to the future? The truth of these doctrines is not dependent
either on our belief or disbelief; and in the way of _natural
consequence_, even were there no additional penal infliction, they may
vindicate themselves hereafter in the case of those who neglect or
disbelieve them here, by leaving them destitute of all the advantages
which flow only from the cordial reception of the truth. Thus much at
least would be in entire accordance with the analogy of our experience
with reference to the interests of the present life; for we do suffer,
even now and here, in consequence of our ignorance, or