ough not belonging to ourselves, is supposed to hold
communication with our minds: and if this were meant merely to remind us
of the limitation of our faculties, and of our consequent liability to
error, or even to teach us the duty of acknowledging our dependence on a
higher power, it might be alike unobjectionable and salutary; but when
it is applied to undermine the authority of private judgment and to
supersede the exercise of free inquiry, they have a tendency to excite
suspicion and distrust in every thoughtful mind. The capital error which
pervades all these speculations consists in not distinguishing aright
between the _evidence_ which constitutes the ground of our belief, and
the _faculty_ by which that evidence is discerned and appreciated. The
Generic Reason of Lamennais, as well as the uniform Tradition of the
Church, may constitute, when duly improved, a branch of the objective
evidence for the truth, and as such they have been applied even by
Protestant writers when they have appealed to _common consent_ as a
collateral proof, auxiliary to that which is more direct and conclusive;
but they cannot be regarded as the exclusive grounds of the certainty of
human knowledge, since this arises from the fundamental, universal, and
invariable laws of human thought.
* * * * *
The term Skepticism, again, may denote either a mere _state of mind_,--a
state of suspense or doubt in regard to some particular fact or opinion;
or _a system of speculative philosophy_, relating to the principles of
human knowledge or the grounds of human belief. In the former sense, it
implies nothing more than the want of a sure and satisfactory conviction
of the truth on the particular point in question. Were it expressed in
words, it would simply amount to a verdict of "non liquet." In the
latter sense, it imports much more than this; it is not merely a _sense_
of doubt respecting any one truth, but a _system_ of doubt in regard to
the grounds of our belief in all truth, a subtle philosophy which seeks
to explain the phenomena of Belief by resolving them into their ultimate
principles, and which often terminates--in explaining them away. In both
forms, it has existed, either continuously or in ever-recurring cycles,
from the earliest dawn of speculative inquiry; and while it has seemed
to retard or arrest the progress of human knowledge, it has really been
overruled as a means of quickening the intellectual
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