o God_, or that we can get rid of all responsibility by
merely _doubting_ His existence. Atheism, in so far as it is _dogmatic_,
must, in his own language, "arrogate infinite knowledge as the ground of
disproof;" and in so far as it is merely _skeptical_, it can afford no
security against the fears and forebodings which _doubt_ on such a
subject must necessarily awaken in every thoughtful mind. And this
consideration will become only the more solemn and impressive the longer
we reflect upon it. Mr. Holyoake, however, is far from being consistent
in his various statements on this subject. For not content with saying,
"Most decidedly I believe that the present order of Nature is
insufficient to prove the existence of an intelligent Creator," he adds
that "_no imaginable order_, that no contrivance, however mechanical,
precise, or clear, would be sufficient to prove it."[261] At one time he
tells us that "an increasing party respectfully and deferentially avow
their inability to subscribe to the arguments supposed to establish the
existence of a Being distinct from Nature." At another, "We have always
held that the existence of Deity is 'past finding out,' and we have held
that the time employed upon the investigation might more profitably be
devoted to the study of humanity." Again, "That central point in all
religious belief--the existence of God--has not yet been approached in a
frank spirit. The very terms of the assertion are as _yet_ an enigma in
language, the fact is _yet_ a problem in philosophy; the world possesses
_as yet_ no adequate logic for that province of our speculation which
lies beyond our immediate experience."[262] "Man must die to solve the
problem of Deity's existence."[263] "The existence of God is a problem
to which the mathematics of human intelligence _seems to me_ to furnish
no solution,"[264] "a problem without a solution, a hieroglyphic without
an interpretation, a gordian knot still untied, a question unanswered, a
thread still unravelled, a labyrinth untrod."[265] That there is here a
strong expression of Skeptical Atheism is evident; but is there not
something more? Does not Skeptical Atheism insensibly transform itself
into Dogmatic, when doubt respecting the sufficiency of the evidence is
combined with a denial of the possibility of any satisfactory proof, or
of the capacity of the human mind to reach it, here or hereafter? Yet
the plea is the want of sufficient evidence now; and this plea i
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