f Philosophy is in this respect at variance
with the prevailing sense of mankind?

An attempt has sometimes been made to draw a distinction between
_popular_ and _philosophical_ Certitude, or, in other words, between the
unreflecting belief of the many and the scientific belief of the few.
Thus, M. Franck distinguishes Certitude, first of all, from the blind
faith which commences with the earliest dawn of intelligence: then, from
the doubt which supervenes on the initial process of inquiry; and then,
from that half-knowledge, that middle term between doubt and certainty,
which is called _probability_. And M. Javari speaks of Certitude "as the
complete demonstration, acquired by reflection, of the legitimacy of any
judgment, or of the reality of any object: this is definitive and
scientific certitude, which is contrasted with that belief, however
strong, which springs, not from the _reflective_, but the _direct and
spontaneous_ exercise of our faculties."[235] It must be evident that,
according to this definition of the term, Certitude, in the scientific
sense of it, as the product of philosophical reflection, must be the
privilege and prerogative of the few, who have been led by taste or
education to cultivate the study of Psychology; while the vast majority
of men, who are nevertheless as _certain_ of the truths which they
believe, and, to say the very least, as little liable to doubt or
skepticism, as any class of philosophers whatever, must be held to have
no Certitude, just because they have no Science. It seems to be assumed
that Certitude is the creation of Science, the product of reflective
thought; whereas it may be demonstrably shown that without Certitude,
Science would be impossible, and that reflection can give forth nothing
but what it finds previously existing in the storehouse of human
consciousness. It surveys the streams of belief, and may trace up these
streams to their highest springs; but it does not, it cannot, create a
new truth, or give birth to a higher certitude. We have no disposition,
assuredly, to underrate the value of philosophical reflection, or to
disparage the science of Psychology; the former may collect the
materials and the latter may attempt the construction, of a goodly and
solid fabric: but we cannot admit that the certainty of all our
knowledge depends upon either of them, or that it is confined
exclusively to the metaphysical inquirer. Reflection adds nothing to the
contents of h