misunderstanding between disputants, and a profitless warfare of words.
In the philosophical sense of the term, that only is said to be
_certain_ which is either an axiomatic truth, intuitively discerned, or
a demonstrated truth, derived from the former by rigorous deduction;
while all that part of our knowledge which is gathered from experience
and observation, however credible in itself and however surely
believed, is characterized as _probable_ only. In the popular sense of
the term, Certitude belongs to all those truths, of whatever kind and in
whatever way acquired, in regard to which we have no reason to be in
doubt or suspense, and which rest on sufficient and satisfactory
evidence. A philosopher is _certain_, in his sense of the term, only of
what he intuitively perceives or can logically demonstrate; a peasant is
_certain_, in his sense of the term, of whatever he distinctly sees, or
clearly remembers, or receives on authentic testimony. There is much
reason, we think, to regret the existence of such a wide difference
between the philosophical and the popular sense of an expression, which
must occur so often both in speculative discussion and in the
intercourse of common life. It may be doubted whether the metaphysician
is entitled to borrow the language of society, and to engraft upon it an
arbitrary definition of his own, different from and even inconsistent
with that which it bears in common usage. Nor can he plead necessity as
a sufficient excuse, or the accuracy of his definition as an effectual
safeguard, since, however needful it may be to discriminate between
_different species_ of Certitude, by marking their peculiar
characteristics and respective sources, surely this might be done more
safely and satisfactorily by designating one kind of it as Intuitive,
another as Demonstrative, another as Moral, or Experimental, or
Historical, than it can be by any arbitrary restriction of the _generic_
term to one or two of the many species which are comprehended under it.
No doubt there is a real distinction, and one of great practical
importance, between _certitude_ and _probability_; but this distinction
is not overlooked in the language of common life;--it is only necessary
to determine what truths belong respectively to each: whereas when all
the truths of Experience, and even, in some cases, those of scientific
Induction, are ranked under the head of _probability_ merely, is it not
evident that the language o