ct, such as may serve, if duly
established, at once to neutralize whatever is false and noxious in the
doctrine of Chance, and at the same time to preserve whatever is true
and wholesome in it, as having a tendency to illustrate the actual
scheme of Divine Providence. And the position which we are disposed to
state and prepared to establish is this: That, with reference to God, as
an omniscient Being, there is, and there can be, no such thing as
"Chance;" while, with reference alike to men and angels, many events may
be fortuitous or accidental, not as being independent of causes, but as
depending on causes unknown, or on combinations of causes whose joint
operation may result in effects absolutely undiscoverable by our limited
intelligence.
This position consists of _two_ parts. It affirms that with reference to
God and His omniscient knowledge, there can be nothing that is
fortuitous, accidental, or unexpected. It affirms, with reference to man
and all created intelligences, that there may, or even must, be much
uncertainty in regard to the products of natural causes, especially when
they act in combination, and come into play in circumstances which we
cannot foresee or control. Many events may thus be casual, accidental,
or unexpected to men, which are not so to the supreme governing
Intelligence. The first part of the position is proved by the general
evidence which warrants us in ascribing omniscience, and especially an
unerring prescience, to the Divine Mind; and it cannot be denied,
without virtually ascribing _ignorance_ to God. The second part of the
position is established by some of the most familiar facts of
experience. We know and feel that however certain all events are to the
omniscient knowledge of the Most High, many of them are entirely beyond
the reach of our limited foresight; and this because they are either
dependent on individual causes which are unknown to us, or on a
combination of various causes, too complex to admit of any rational
computation in regard to their results.
The "calculation of chances" has been reduced to something like
scientific accuracy;[218] and it has been applied, with beneficial
effect, to the insurance of life and property on land and at sea. Even
the casual events of human history may be said, in a certain sense, to
be governed by fixed laws. The _aggregate result_ in such cases may be
tolerably certain, while the _individual cases_ are very much the
reverse; and hen
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