s, as being inherently pleasant or
painful; _thirdly_, by the _natural consequences_ of our actions, which
indicate a sure connection between moral and physical evil; and,
_fourthly_, by the _moral atmosphere_ in which we are placed, as being
members of a community in which the distinction between right and wrong
is universally acknowledged, and applied in the way of approbation or
censure. By such proofs, the Providence of God may be shown to be a
scheme both of _natural_ and _moral_ government,--two aspects of the
same system which are _equally real_, yet _widely different_. But the
distinction between the two, although founded on a real and radical
difference, is not such as to imply that they have no relation to each
other, or no mutual influence, as distinct but connected parts of the
same comprehensive scheme. They are not isolated, but interpenetrating;
they come into contact at many points, and _the natural is made
subordinate and subservient to the moral_. For there is a beautiful
gradation in the order of the established laws of Nature. The physical
laws are made subordinate and subservient to the organic; both the
physical and organic are subservient to the intellectual; the physical,
organic, and intellectual are subservient to the moral; and the
intellectual and moral are subservient to our preparation for the
spiritual and eternal. In the words of Bishop Butler, "The natural and
moral constitution and government of the world are _so connected_ as to
make up together but _one scheme_; and it is highly probable that the
first is formed and carried on merely in _subserviency to the latter_,
as the vegetable world is for the animal, and organized bodies for
minds."[204]

Every instance of pleasure or pain arising from the voluntary actions of
men, is a proof that a relation of some kind has been established
between all the distinct, but independent, provinces of Nature; and the
invariable connection between moral and physical evil shows how the
lower are made subservient to the higher departments of the Divine
government. Apart from a scheme of moral discipline, there is no reason
discernible, _a priori_, why pain should be the accompaniment or
consequent of one mode of action rather than another; and the relations
which have been established, in the natural constitution of things,
between sin and misery, affords a strong proof not only of the _reality_
of a moral government, but of the _subordination_ of phys