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l sustained by God's will in Providence, subject, however, to be suspended or revoked according to His pleasure. In the second, which resembles in some respects the doctrine of "occasional causes," all natural effects are ascribed to powers not _imparted_, but _impressed_, not belonging to the natural agent, but communicated by impulse _ab extra_; and God's will is represented as the only efficient cause in Nature. In both forms of the theory, the agency of God and the instrumentality of natural means are, in a certain sense, acknowledged; but in the _former_, second causes are apt to be regarded as if they were self-existent and independent of God; in the _latter_, second causes are apt to be virtually annulled, and all events to be regarded as the immediate effects of Divine volition. Both extremes are dangerous. For, on the one hand, the operation of second causes cannot be regarded as necessary and independent, without severing the tie which connects the created universe with the will of the Supreme; and, on the other hand, the operation of second causes cannot be excluded or denied, without virtually making God's will _the only efficient cause_, and thereby charging directly and immediately on Him, not only all the physical changes which occur in Nature, but also all the volitions and actions of His creatures. In order to guard against these opposite and equally dangerous extremes, we must hold the real existence and actual operation of "second causes;" while we are careful, at the same time, to show both that whatever powers belong to any created being were originally conferred by God, and also that they are still preserved and perpetuated by Him, subject to his control, and liable to be suspended or revoked, according to the pleasure of His will. We would thus have _one First_, and MANY SECOND CAUSES; the former _supreme_, the latter _subordinate_; really distinct, but not equally independent, since "second causes" are, from their very nature, subject to the dominion and control of that Omniscient Mind which called them into being, and which knows how to overrule them all for the accomplishment of His great designs. We are aware that some are unwilling to acknowledge the _efficiency_ of any "second causes," and seek to resolve all events, even such as are brought about by the volitions of men, into the will of God, as the only Agent in Nature. Others, again, admitting the existence of created spirits, and their
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