principle; and
expressly assigns his reasons for _not_ being a Materialist.[168] But he
appears to have thought, as Locke did, that possibly the power of
thinking might be superadded to matter, by the Creator's omnipotent
will, and that there is nothing in this supposition which could
seriously affect either the doctrine of Theism or the "immortality" of
man. And hence he affirmed, in words which Dr. Priestley selected for
the motto of his "Disquisitions," that "if any one should ever
demonstrate the soul to be material, far from being alarmed at this, we
should only admire the power which could give to _matter_ the power of
_thinking_."
We conceive that the language both of Locke and Bonnet on this
particular point amounts to a dangerous and very unnecessary concession.
Were it meant merely to affirm that God could so unite a thinking
spiritual being with a material organism, as to make the two mutually
dependent and subservient, this is no more than is admitted by all the
advocates of Immaterialism, and it is actually exhibited in the
constitution of human nature. But if it were meant to admit that the
power of "thinking" and "willing" might be superadded as a property or
quality to matter itself, _without any substantive being other than
matter as a substratum_, then we conceive it to be at variance with the
grounds on which Locke and Bonnet themselves had previously declared
their belief in the distinct existence both of matter and spirit. We
shall only add, that the prejudice against our doctrine, which is
founded on the union of two _substances_ apparently so heterogeneous as
mind and matter in _the same person_, is, to say the least, fully
counterbalanced by the difficulty, incident to the theory, of
demonstrating the coexistence of _two sets of properties_, apparently so
diverse and disparate as thought and extension, "vis inertiae" and
spontaneity, in _the same substance_.
On the whole, we conclude that the same reason which warrants us in
ascribing certain properties or phenomena to a distinct substance called
"matter," equally warrants us in ascribing certain other properties or
phenomena to a distinct substance called "mind;" and that the difference
between their properties and phenomena is so great as to justify the
belief that the substances are different, and ought to be denominated by
distinctive names.
V. Our _fifth_ proposition is, That it is impossible to account for the
phenomena of thought, f
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