these, the practical importance of
the subject may be clearly evinced.

1. The doctrine of "the immortality of the soul" is seriously affected
by the theory of Materialism. That there is _some_ connection between
the two is apparent from the very anxiety with which infidels have
labored to undermine the doctrine of "spirit," on purpose to get rid of
the doctrine of "immortality." But in stating the connection between
them, we must exercise the utmost caution, lest we should unwarily place
the truth on a precarious or questionable basis. In arguing for the
future life of the soul, as a doctrine of Natural Religion, some writers
have spoken as if they supposed that nothing more was needful to
demonstrate its "immortality" than the bare fact of its being
"immaterial," and that, by its very nature as "spirit," it is
indestructible by God Himself. Now, we do not hold that the mere proof
of its being an immaterial substance would necessarily infer its being
also immortal. For ought we know, the principle of life, sensation,
memory, and volition _may_ belong to an immaterial substance even in the
lower animals, who are not supposed to be immortal; and the only use
which we would make of its "immateriality" in connection with its
"immortality," is simply this,--that not being material, _its
destruction is not necessarily implied in the dissolution of the body_.
It is not in the metaphysical doctrine of its immaterial nature, but in
the practical evidence of its moral responsibilities and religious
capacities, that we find the most satisfactory natural proof of its
immortality. It is perfectly possible to hold, on the one hand, that all
"immaterial substances" are not necessarily indestructible; and yet to
hold, on the other hand, that _such_ an immaterial substance as the soul
of man is known to be,--endowed with conscience, with intelligence, with
affections and aspirations, with hopes and fears such as can find no
suitable object and no adequate range within the limits of the present
life,--must be destined to an immortal existence. The "immortality," for
which alone we ought to contend, is such as implies neither a necessity
of existence in the creature, nor its independence on the will of the
Creator. The _power_ of God to annihilate the soul is not called in
question, but the _purpose_ of God to make the soul immortal is inferred
from its nature and capacities, its aspirations and hopes and fears. And
all that is necessari