nd thought."[166]

In these and similar passages, Locke did not mean, we think, to retract
or modify the doctrine which he had taught respecting the radical
distinction betwixt mind and matter; he intended merely to intimate
that, in adopting that doctrine, he proceeded on grounds different from
those which had been assumed by some other writers; that his belief
rested mainly on the essential difference between the properties
belonging to the two substances, and not on the mere metaphysical
arguments by which some had attempted to prove that God himself could
not impart to matter the power of thinking. He shrunk from pronouncing a
positive decision on _this_ one point; and yet his words have ever since
been quoted with triumph by the advocates of Materialism as affording a
virtual sanction to _the possibility_ at least of that for which they
contend. And on the same account, Locke has been severely blamed by some
modern "spiritualists." Mr. Carlyle, speaking of "Hartley's and
Darwin's, and all the possible forms of Materialism,--the grand
Idolatry, as we may rightly call it, by which at all times the true
worship, that of the invisible, has been polluted and withstood"--adds
the following characteristic remarks: "Locke, himself a clear,
humble-minded, patient, reverent, nay religious man, had paved the way
for banishing religion from the world. Mind, by being modelled in men's
imaginations into a Shape, a Visibility, and reasoned of as if it had
been some composite, divisible, and reunitable substance, some finer
chemical salt, or curious piece of logical joinery, began to lose its
immaterial, mysterious, divine, though invisible character: it was
tacitly figured as something that might, were our organs fine enough, be
_seen_. Yet who had ever seen it? who could ever see it? Thus, by
degrees, it passed into a Doubt, a Relation, some faint Possibility,
and, at last, into a highly probably Nonentity. Following Locke's
footsteps, the French had discovered that 'as the stomach secretes
chyle, so does the brain secrete thought.'"[167]

The sentiments of Bonnet of Geneva, as stated in his "Palingenesie," are
substantially in accordance with those of Locke, and have met with
similar treatment. He is not a Materialist; he admits a real
distinction, as well as a close union, between the soul and the body; he
speaks even of the possible existence of disembodied souls or pure
spirits; he affirms the immateriality of the thinking