m" is
unavoidable, unless we are to materialize God as well as man; and why
may there not be a "dualism" in the case of created _mind_ and _matter_,
as there must be, on any supposition except that of Pantheism, in the
case of the uncreated mind and the material universe? We see variety and
gradation in all the works of God; we see thousands of substances,
simple and compound, possessing various properties, even in the
inorganic world; we see different forms of life, vegetable and animal,
ascending by steps of regular gradation, from the lowest to the highest;
we see, in the animal kingdom, various propensities, instincts, and
powers, which constitute the characteristics of distinct species; at
length we rise to Man, with his rational, responsible, and immortal
nature. Why may not Man be the _nexus_ between a world of "matter" and a
world of "spirits,"--Man, who is equally connected with the material
world by his body, and with the spiritual by his soul,--who is, as it
were, "mind incarnate," spirit in flesh? And why may there not be higher
spirits still, whether embodied in subtler and more refined vehicles, or
existing apart from all material forms, in those other worlds which
Astronomy has brought to light? No reason can be assigned for a negative
answer to these and similar queries, unless it be that _we cannot
conceive of pure spirit without bodily form_; and this may be true, if
it be meant merely to affirm that we can find no sensible image for it,
nothing by which it can be represented to our sight, or pictured in our
imagination, as visible things may be; but it is not true, if it be
meant to imply that we have no distinct notion of "mind" or "spirit,"
for it is as clearly known by its properties, of thought, feeling,
volition, and consciousness, as matter itself can be; and who will
venture to define, or to depict, or to form any image of _the substance
of matter_, apart from the properties which belong to it?

We are under no necessity, then, of adopting the theory of
"unisubstancisme," and we cannot found upon it in argument without
building on a mere gratuitous assumption.

IV. Our _fourth_ proposition is, That the same reason which warrants us
in ascribing certain properties and phenomena to a distinct substance
called "matter," equally warrants us in ascribing certain other
properties and phenomena to a distinct substance called "mind;" and that
the difference between their respective properties and phen