ing, followed by a process of reasoning; it is gained
by the mind having first suffered something, and then done something.
Therefore, to say _there is no such thing as matter_ would be a much
less absurd inference than to say _there is no such thing as mind_." ...
"The truth is, that we believe in the existence of 'matter,' because we
cannot help it. The inferences of our reason from our sensations impel
us to this conclusion, and the steps are few and short by which we reach
it. But the steps are fewer, and shorter, and of the self-same nature,
which lead us to believe in the existence of Mind, for of that we have
the evidence within ourselves."[163]

It follows that were we reduced, as we are not, to the necessity of
adopting the theory of "unisubstancisme," we might with at least as good
reason dispense with the existence of "matter" as with the existence of
"mind;" for, in the words of Dugald Stewart, "it would no more be proper
to say of 'mind' that it is _material_, than to say of 'body' that it is
_spiritual."_[164]

III. Our _third_ proposition is, That we are _not_ reduced to the
necessity of adopting any theory of "unisubstancisme," since there is
nothing inconceivable or self-contradictory in the supposition of two
distinct substantive beings, possessing diverse properties, such as
"mind" and "body," or "spirit" and "matter," are usually held to be.

Let any one endeavor to assign a reason for the sole, exclusive
existence either of "matter" or of "spirit," or a distinct, specific
ground for the opinion that they are necessarily incompatible with each
other, and he will be compelled to own that the theory of
"unisubstancisme," however plausible by reason of its apparent
simplicity, is really nothing more than a gratuitous assumption. It
cannot be admitted with reference even to _nature_ and _man_ without
confounding the simplest elements of human knowledge; and with reference
to _God_ and the _universe_, it is attended with still more fatal
consequences, since it must lead, if consistently followed out, to
undisguised Pantheism. Why should it be supposed that there is, or can
only be, _one_ substance in Nature? one substance invested with all
those properties and powers which exist, in such manifold diversity, in
the organic and inorganic kingdoms? The wonder might rather seem to be
that any _two_ substances should be capable of accounting for such a
variety of phenomena as the universe exhibits. A "dualis