s of men, and they are utterly
unnecessary for the support of any doctrine which we are concerned to
defend.

On the whole, we venture to conclude that the radical distinction
between Mind and Matter has not been materially affected by the recent
progress of Physiological research, and that the old arguments against
Materialism are still available, except in so far as they were founded
on a too limited view of the properties of matter, which the advancing
Science of Chemistry has done so much, to unfold and to illustrate.

II. Our _second_ proposition may be thus stated: That were we reduced to
the necessity of embracing any form of the theory of "unisubstancisme,"
there could not be less,--there might even be greater,--reason for
_spiritualizing matter_, than for _materializing mind_.

On the supposition that one or other of the two must be dispensed with,
the question still remains, which of them can be most easily spared? or,
which of them can be most conclusively proved? Mankind have generally
thought that they had equally good evidence for the existence of both;
that in the direct and irresistible evidence of Consciousness, they had
proof sufficient of a thinking, voluntary, and active spirit, and in the
less direct, but not less irresistible, evidence of Perception, proof
sufficient of the existence of a material world. But each of these
convictions has been in its turn assailed by the cavils of skepticism;
and men have been asked to prove _by reasoning_ what needed, and,
indeed, admitted of no _such_ proof,--the existence of Matter as
distinct from Mind, and the existence of Mind as distinct from Matter.
The latter is denied by Materialists, the former is equally denied by
Idealists; and what we affirm is, that each of these opposite theories
is one-sided and partial, and that, on the supposition of our being
reduced to the necessity of adopting the idea of "unisubstancisme," we
should still have greater reason to reduce all to the category of
"spirit," than to reduce all to the category of "matter." Many seem to
think that it is more easy, or, perhaps, that it is less necessary, to
prove the distinct existence of matter, than to prove the distinct
existence of mind. They are so familiar with matter, and so continually
surrounded by it, that they cannot conceive of its non-existence as
possible, and scarcely think it necessary to inquire after any evidence
in the case. But can it be justly said that they are mo