lust and passion and the other
vicious parts of the same mind? Listen thus far; for
presently he adds, But still there are dissimilarities to be
recognized in governing and in obeying. For as the mind is
said to govern the body, and also to govern lust, still it
governs the body as a king governs his subjects, or a parent
his children; but it governs lust as a master governs his
slaves, because it restrains and breaks it. The authority of
kings, of generals, of magistrates, of fathers, and of
nations, rules their subjects and allies as the mind rules
bodies; but masters control their slaves, as the best part of
the mind--that is to say, wisdom--controls the vicious and
weak parts of itself, such as lust, passion, and the other
perturbations.

For there is a kind of unjust slavery when those belong to
some one else who might be their own masters; but when those
are slaves who cannot govern themselves, there is no injury
done.

XXVI. If, says Carneades, you were to know that an asp was
lying hidden anywhere, and that some one who did not know it
was going to sit upon it, whose death would be a gain to you,
you would act wickedly if you did not warn him not to sit
down. Still, you would not be liable to punishment; for who
could prove that you had known? But we are bringing forward
too many instances; for it is plain that unless equity, good
faith, and justice proceed from nature, and if all these
things are referred to interest, a good man cannot be found.
And on these topics a great deal is said by Laelius in our
treatise on the Republic.

If, as we are reminded by you, we have spoken well in that
treatise, when we said that nothing is good excepting what is
honorable, and nothing bad excepting what is disgraceful.
* * *

XXVII. I am glad that you approve of the doctrine that the
affection borne to our children is implanted by nature;
indeed, if it be not, there can be no conection between man
and man which has its origin in nature. And if there be not,
then there is an end of all society in life. May it turn out
well, says Carneades, speaking shamelessly, but still more
sensibly than my friend Lucius or Patro: for, as they refer
everything to themselves, do they think that anything is ever
done for the sake of