rstanding by that term a frank and
single-minded man--we have little need of captious casuists, quibblers,
and slanderers. For those men assert that the wise man does not seek
virtue because of the personal gratification which the practice of
justice and beneficence procures him, but rather because the life of
the good man is free from fear, care, solicitude, and peril; while, on
the other hand, the wicked always feel in their souls a certain
suspicion, and always behold before their eyes images of judgment and
punishment. Do not you think, therefore, that there is any benefit, or
that there is any advantage which can be procured by injustice,
precious enough to counterbalance the constant pressure of remorse, and
the haunting consciousness that retribution awaits the sinner, and
hangs over his devoted head.[342] * * *

XVII. [Our philosophers, therefore, put a case. Suppose, say they, two
men, one of whom is an excellent and admirable person, of high honor
and remarkable integrity; the latter is distinguished by nothing but
his vice and audacity. And suppose that their city has so mistaken
their characters as to imagine the good man to be a scandalous,
impious, and audacious criminal, and to esteem the wicked man, on the
contrary, as a pattern of probity and fidelity. On account of this
error of their fellow-citizens, the good man is arrested and tormented,
his hands are cut off, his eyes are plucked out, he is condemned,
bound, burned, exterminated, reduced to want, and to the last appears
to all men to be most deservedly the most miserable of men. On the
other hand, the flagitious wretch is exalted, worshipped, loved by all,
and honors, offices, riches, and emoluments are all conferred on him,
and he shall be reckoned by his fellow-citizens the best and worthiest
of mortals, and in the highest degree deserving of all manner of
prosperity. Yet, for all this, who is so mad as to doubt which of these
two men he would rather be?

XVIII. What happens among individuals happens also among nations. There
is no state so absurd and ridiculous as not to prefer unjust dominion
to just subordination. I need not go far for examples. During my own
consulship, when you were my fellow-counsellors, we consulted
respecting the treaty of Numantia. No one was ignorant that Quintus
Pompey had signed a treaty, and that Mancinus had done the same. The
latter, being a virtuous man, supported the proposition which I laid
before the people,