y, when we dream that we are dreaming.

Further, I grant that no one can be deceived, so far as
actual perception extends--that is, I grant that the mind's
imaginations, regarded in themselves, do not involve error (II.
xvii. note); but I deny, that a man does not, in the act of
perception, make any affirmation. For what is the perception of
a winged horse, save affirming that a horse has wings? If the
mind could perceive nothing else but the winged horse, it would
regard the same as present to itself: it would have no reasons
for doubting its existence, nor any faculty of dissent, unless
the imagination of a winged horse be joined to an idea which
precludes the existence of the said horse, or unless the mind
perceives that the idea which it possess of a winged horse is
inadequate, in which case it will either necessarily deny the
existence of such a horse, or will necessarily be in doubt on the
subject.

I think that I have anticipated my answer to the third
objection, namely, that the will is something universal which is
predicated of all ideas, and that it only signifies that which is
common to all ideas, namely, an affirmation, whose adequate
essence must, therefore, in so far as it is thus conceived in the
abstract, be in every idea, and be, in this respect alone, the
same in all, not in so far as it is considered as constituting
the idea's essence: for, in this respect, particular
affirmations differ one from the other, as much as do ideas. For
instance, the affirmation which involves the idea of a circle,
differs from that which involves the idea of a triangle, as much
as the idea of a circle differs from the idea of a triangle.

Further, I absolutely deny, that we are in need of an equal
power of thinking, to affirm that that which is true is true, and
to affirm that that which is false is true. These two
affirmations, if we regard the mind, are in the same relation to
one another as being and not--being; for there is nothing
positive in ideas, which constitutes the actual reality of
falsehood (II. xxxv. note, and xlvii. note).

We must therefore conclude, that we are easily deceived, when
we confuse universals with singulars, and the entities of reason
and abstractions with realities. As for the fourth objection, I
am quite ready to admit, that a man placed in the equilibrium
described (namely, as perceiving nothing but hunger and thirst,
a certain food and a certain drink, each equally distant fro