y
follow either from an adequate or from an inadequate idea. But
in so far as the mind (III. i.) has inadequate ideas, it is
necessarily passive: wherefore the activities of the mind follow
solely from adequate ideas, and accordingly the mind is only
passive in so far as it has inadequate ideas. Q.E.D.

Note.--Thus we see, that passive states are not attributed to
the mind, except in so far as it contains something involving
negation, or in so far as it is regarded as a part of nature,
which cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived through itself
without other parts: I could thus show, that passive states are
attributed to individual things in the same way that they are
attributed to the mind, and that they cannot otherwise be
perceived, but my purpose is solely to treat of the human mind.

PROP. IV. Nothing can be destroyed, except by a cause external
to itself.

Proof.--This proposition is self--evident, for the definition
of anything affirms the essence of that thing, but does not
negative it; in other words, it postulates the essence of the
thing, but does not take it away. So long therefore as we regard
only the thing itself, without taking into account external
causes, we shall not be able to find in it anything which could
destroy it. Q.E.D.

PROP. V. Things are naturally contrary, that is, cannot exist in
the same object, in so far as one is capable of destroying the
other.

Proof.--If they could agree together or co--exist in the same
object, there would then be in the said object something which
could destroy it; but this, by the foregoing proposition, is
absurd, therefore things, &c. Q.E.D.

PROP. VI. Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours
to persist in its own being.

Proof.--Individual things are modes whereby the attributes of
God are expressed in a given determinate manner (I. xxv. Coroll.);
that is, (I. xxxiv.), they are things which express in a given
determinate manner the power of God, whereby God is and acts;
now no thing contains in itself anything whereby it can be
destroyed, or which can take away its existence (III. iv.); but
contrariwise it is opposed to all that could take away its
existence (III. v.). Therefore, in so far as it can, and in so
far as it is in itself, it endeavours to persist in its own
being. Q.E.D.

PROP. VII. The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to
persist in its own being, is nothing else but the actual essence
of the thing