object of his hatred is painfully
affected, will feel pleasure, to an extent proportioned to the
amount of pain he conceives in the object of his hatred. This
was our first point. Again, pleasure postulates the existence of
the pleasurably affected thing (III. xi. note), in proportion as
the pleasure is greater or less. If anyone imagines that an
object of his hatred is pleasurably affected, this conception
(III. xiii.) will hinder his own endeavour to persist; in other
words (III. xi. note), he who hates will be painfully affected.
Q.E.D.

Note.--This pleasure can scarcely be felt unalloyed, and
without any mental conflict. For (as I am about to show in Prop.
xxvii.), in so far as a man conceives that something similar to
himself is affected by pain, he will himself be affected in like
manner; and he will have the contrary emotion in contrary
circumstances. But here we are regarding hatred only.

PROP. XXIV. If we conceive that anyone pleasurably affects an
object of our hate, we shall feel hatred towards him also. If we
conceive that he painfully affects that said object, we shall
feel love towards him.

Proof.--This proposition is proved in the same way as III.
xxii., which see.

Note.--These and similar emotions of hatred are attributable
to envy, which, accordingly, is nothing else but hatred, in so
far as it is regarded as disposing a man to rejoice in another's
hurt, and to grieve at another's advantage.

PROP. XXV. We endeavour to affirm, concerning ourselves, and
concerning what we love, everything that we can conceive to
affect pleasurably ourselves, or the loved object. Contrariwise,
we endeavour to negative everything, which we conceive to affect
painfully ourselves or the loved object.

Proof.--That, which we conceive to affect an object of our
love pleasurably or painfully, affects us also pleasurably or
painfully (III. xxi.). But the mind (III. xii.) endeavours, as
far as possible, to conceive those things which affect us
pleasurably; in other words (II. xvii. and Coroll.), it
endeavours to regard them as present. And, contrariwise (III.
xiii.), it endeavours to exclude the existence of such things as
affect us painfully; therefore, we endeavour to affirm
concerning ourselves, and concerning the loved object, whatever
we conceive to affect ourselves, or the love object pleasurably.
Q.E.D.

PROP. XXVI. We endeavour to affirm, concerning that which we
hate, everything which we conce