an only be the activity of transition
from a greater to a less perfection--in other words, it is an
activity whereby a man's power of action is lessened or
constrained (cf. III. xi. note). I pass over the definitions of
merriment, stimulation, melancholy, and grief, because these
terms are generally used in reference to the body, and are merely
kinds of pleasure or pain.

IV. Wonder is the conception (imaginatio) of anything, wherein
the mind comes to a stand, because the particular concept in
question has no connection with other concepts (cf. III. lii. and
note).

Explanation--In the note to II. xviii. we showed the reason,
why the mind, from the contemplation of one thing, straightway
falls to the contemplation of another thing, namely, because the
images of the two things are so associated and arranged, that one
follows the other. This state of association is impossible, if
the image of the thing be new; the mind will then be at a stand
in the contemplation thereof, until it is determined by other
causes to think of something else.

Thus the conception of a new object, considered in itself, is
of the same nature as other conceptions; hence, I do not include
wonder among the emotions, nor do I see why I should so include
it, inasmuch as this distraction of the mind arises from no
positive cause drawing away the mind from other objects, but
merely from the absence of a cause, which should determine the
mind to pass from the contemplation of one object to the
contemplation of another.

I, therefore, recognize only three primitive or primary
emotions (as I said in the note to III. xi.), namely, pleasure,
pain, and desire. I have spoken of wonder simply because it is
customary to speak of certain emotions springing from the three
primitive ones by different names, when they are referred to the
objects of our wonder. I am led by the same motive to add a
definition of contempt.

V. Contempt is the conception of anything which touches the mind
so little, that its presence leads the mind to imagine those
qualities which are not in it rather than such as are in it (cf.
III. lii. note).

The definitions of veneration and scorn I here pass over, for
I am not aware that any emotions are named after them.

VI. Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external
cause.

Explanation--This definition explains sufficiently clearly the
essence of love; the definition given by those authors who say
that love