extent doubt
the issue (cf. III. xviii. note).

Explanation--From these definitions it follows, that there is
no hope unmingled with fear, and no fear unmingled with hope.
For he, who depends on hope and doubts concerning the issue of
anything, is assumed to conceive something, which excludes the
existence of the said thing in the future; therefore he, to this
extent, feels pain (cf. III. xix.); consequently, while
dependent on hope, he fears for the issue. Contrariwise he, who
fears, in other words doubts, concerning the issue of something
which he hates, also conceives something which excludes the
existence of the thing in question; to this extent he feels
pleasure, and consequently to this extent he hopes that it will
turn out as he desires (III. xx.).

XIV. Confidence is pleasure arising from the idea of something
past or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.

XV. Despair is pain arising from the idea of something past or
future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.

Explanation--Thus confidence springs from hope, and despair
from fear, when all cause for doubt as to the issue of an event
has been removed: this comes to pass, because man conceives
something past or future as present and regards it as such, or
else because he conceives other things, which exclude the
existence of the causes of his doubt. For, although we can never
be absolutely certain of the issue of any particular event (II.
xxxi. Coroll.), it may nevertheless happen that we feel no doubt
concerning it. For we have shown, that to feel no doubt
concerning a thing is not the same as to be quite certain of it
(II. xlix. note). Thus it may happen that we are affected by the
same emotion of pleasure or pain concerning a thing past or
future, as concerning the conception of a thing present; this I
have already shown in III. xviii., to which, with its note, I
refer the reader.

XVI. Joy is pleasure accompanied by the idea of something past,
which has had an issue beyond our hope.

XVII. Disappointment is pain accompanied by the idea of
something past, which has had an issue contrary to our hope.

XVIII. Pity is pain accompanied by the idea of evil, which has
befallen someone else whom we conceive to be like ourselves (cf.
III. xxii. note, and III. xxvii. note).

Explanation--Between pity and sympathy (misericordia) there
seems to be no difference, unless perhaps that the former term is
used in reference to