rface of water are reflected into our eyes, we imagine
the sun as if it were in the water, though we are aware of its
real position; and similarly other imaginations, wherein the
mind is deceived, whether they indicate the natural disposition
of the body, or that its power of activity is increased or
diminished, are not contrary to the truth, and do not vanish at
its presence. It happens indeed that, when we mistakenly fear an
evil, the fear vanishes when we hear the true tidings; but the
contrary also happens, namely, that we fear an evil which will
certainly come, and our fear vanishes when we hear false tidings;
thus imaginations do not vanish at the presence of the truth,
in virtue of its being true, but because other imaginations,
stronger than the first, supervene and exclude the present
existence of that which we imagined, as I have shown in II. xvii.

PROP. II. We are only passive, in so far as we are apart of
Nature, which cannot be conceived by itself without other parts.

Proof.--We are said to be passive, when something arises in
us, whereof we are only a partial cause (III. Def. ii.), that is
(III. Def. i.), something which cannot be deduced solely from the
laws of our nature. We are passive therefore, in so far as we
are a part of Nature, which cannot be conceived by itself without
other parts. Q.E.D.

PROP. III. The force whereby a man persists in existing is
limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external
causes.

Proof.--This is evident from the axiom of this part. For,
when man is given, there is something else--say A--more powerful;
when A is given, there is something else--say B--more powerful than
A, and so on to infinity; thus the power of man is limited by
the power of some other thing, and is infinitely surpassed by the
power of external causes. Q.E.D.

PROP. IV. It is impossible, that man should not be a part of
Nature, or that he should be capable of undergoing no changes,
save such as can be understood through his nature only as their
adequate cause.

Proof.--The power, whereby each particular thing, and
consequently man, preserves his being, is the power of God or of
Nature (I. xxiv. Coroll.); not in so far as it is infinite, but
in so far as it can be explained by the actual human essence
(III. vii.). Thus the power of man, in so far as it is explained
through his own actual essence, is a part of the infinite power
of God or Nature, in other words, of the ess