ose actions, which follow from the
necessity, of our nature considered in itself alone. But pain is
bad, in so far as it diminishes or checks the power of action
(IV. xli.); wherefore we cannot by pain be determined to any
action, which we should be unable to perform under the guidance
of reason. Again, pleasure is bad only in so far as it hinders a
man's capability for action (IV. xli. xliii.); therefore to this
extent we could not be determined by it to any action, which we
could not perform under the guidance of reason. Lastly,
pleasure, in so far as it is good, is in harmony with reason (for
it consists in the fact that a man's capability for action is
increased or aided); nor is the mind passive therein, except in
so far as a man's power of action is not increased to the extent
of affording him an adequate conception of himself and his
actions (III. iii., and note).

Wherefore, if a man who is pleasurably affected be brought to
such a state of perfection, that he gains an adequate conception
of himself and his own actions, he will be equally, nay more,
capable of those actions, to which he is determined by emotion
wherein the mind is passive. But all emotions are attributable
to pleasure, to pain, or to desire (Def. of the Emotions, iv.
explanation); and desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) is nothing
else but the attempt to act; therefore, to all actions, &c.
Q.E.D.

Another Proof.--A given action is called bad, in so far as it
arises from one being affected by hatred or any evil emotion.
But no action, considered in itself alone, is either good or bad
(as we pointed out in the preface to Pt. IV.), one and the same
action being sometimes good, sometimes bad; wherefore to the
action which is sometimes bad, or arises from some evil emotion,
we may be led by reason (IV. xix.). Q.E.D.

Note.--An example will put this point in a clearer light. The
action of striking, in so far as it is considered physically, and
in so far as we merely look to the fact that a man raises his
arm, clenches his fist, and moves his whole arm violently
downwards, is a virtue or excellence which is conceived as proper
to the structure of the human body. If, then, a man, moved by
anger or hatred, is led to clench his fist or to move his arm,
this result takes place (as we showed in Pt. II.), because one
and the same action can be associated with various mental images
of things; therefore we may be determined to the performance of
on