gs in relation to time (V. xxi. II. xxvi.). But
eternity cannot be explained in terms of duration (I. Def. viii.
and explanation). Therefore to this extent the mind has not the
power of conceiving things under the form of eternity, but it
possesses such power, because it is of the nature of reason to
conceive things under the form of eternity (II. xliv. Coroll.
ii.), and also because it is of the nature of the mind to
conceive the essence of the body under the form of eternity (V.
xxiii.), for besides these two there is nothing which belongs to
the essence of mind (II. xiii.). Therefore this power of
conceiving things under the form of eternity only belongs to the
mind in virtue of the mind's conceiving the essence of the body
under the form of eternity. Q.E.D.

Note.--Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways; either as
existing in relation to a given time and place, or as contained in
God and following from the necessity of the divine nature.
Whatsoever we conceive in this second way as true or real, we
conceive under the form of eternity, and their ideas involve the
eternal and infinite essence of God, as we showed in II. xlv. and
note, which see.

PROP. XXX. Our mind, in so far as it knows itself and the body
under the form of eternity, has to that extent necessarily a
knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God, and is conceived
through God.

Proof.--Eternity is the very essence of God, in so far as this
involves necessary existence (I. Def. viii.). Therefore to
conceive things under the form of eternity, is to conceive things
in so far as they are conceived through the essence of God as
real entities, or in so far as they involve existence through the
essence of God; wherefore our mind, in so far as it conceives
itself and the body under the form of eternity, has to that
extent necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows, &c. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXI. The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind, as
its formal cause, in so far as the mind itself is eternal.

Proof.--The mind does not conceive anything under the form of
eternity, except in so far as it conceives its own body under the
form of eternity (V. xxix.); that is, except in so far as it is
eternal (V. xxi. xxiii.); therefore (by the last Prop.), in so
far as it is eternal, it possesses the knowledge of God, which
knowledge is necessarily adequate (II. xlvi.); hence the mind,
in so far as it is eternal, is capable of knowing everything
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