rtion as the mind is more capable of
understanding things by the third kind of knowledge, it desires
more to understand things by that kind.

Proof--This is evident. For, in so far as we conceive the
mind to be capable of conceiving things by this kind of
knowledge, we, to that extent, conceive it as determined thus to
conceive things; and consequently (Def. of the Emotions, i.),
the mind desires so to do, in proportion as it is more capable
thereof. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXVII. From this third kind of knowledge arises the
highest possible mental acquiescence.

Proof.--The highest virtue of the mind is to know God (IV.
xxviii.), or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge
(V. xxv.), and this virtue is greater in proportion as the mind
knows things more by the said kind of knowledge (V. xxiv.):
consequently, he who knows things by this kind of knowledge
passes to the summit of human perfection, and is therefore (Def.
of the Emotions, ii.) affected by the highest pleasure, such
pleasure being accompanied by the idea of himself and his own
virtue; thus (Def. of the Emotions, xxv.), from this kind of
knowledge arises the highest possible acquiescence. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXVIII. The endeavour or desire to know things by the
third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from the
second kind of knowledge.

Proof.--This proposition is self--evident. For whatsoever we
understand clearly and distinctly, we understand either through
itself, or through that which is conceived through itself; that
is, ideas which are clear and distinct in us, or which are
referred to the third kind of knowledge (II. xl. note. ii.)
cannot follow from ideas that are fragmentary and confused, and
are referred to knowledge of the first kind, but must follow from
adequate ideas, or ideas of the second and third kind of
knowledge; therefore (Def. of the Emotions, i.), the desire of
knowing things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from
the first, but from the second kind. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXIX. Whatsoever the mind understands under the form of
eternity, it does not understand by virtue of conceiving the
present actual existence of the body, but by virtue of conceiving
the essence of the body under the form of eternity.

Proof.--In so far as the mind conceives the present existence
of its body, it to that extent conceives duration which can be
determined by time, and to that extent only has it the power of
conceiving thin