the point from which I started), which consists in
a true knowledge thereof, nothing more excellent, being within
our power, can be devised. For the mind has no other power save
that of thinking and of forming adequate ideas, as we have shown
above (III. iii.).
PROP. V. An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive simply,
and not as necessary, or as contingent, or as possible, is, other
conditions being equal, greater than any other emotion.
Proof.--An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to be
free, is greater than one towards what we conceive to be
necessary (III. xlix.), and, consequently, still greater than one
towards what we conceive as possible, or contingent (IV. xi.).
But to conceive a thing as free can be nothing else than to
conceive it simply, while we are in ignorance of the causes
whereby it has been determined to action (II. xxxv. note);
therefore, an emotion towards a thing which we conceive simply
is, other conditions being equal, greater than one, which we feel
towards what is necessary, possible, or contingent, and,
consequently, it is the greatest of all. Q.E.D.
PROP. VI. The mind has greater power over the emotions and is
less subject thereto, in so far as it understands all things as
necessary.
Proof.--The mind understands all things to be necessary (I.
xxix.) and to be determined to existence and operation by an
infinite chain of causes; therefore (by the foregoing
Proposition), it thus far brings it about, that it is less
subject to the emotions arising therefrom, and (III. xlviii.)
feels less emotion towards the things themselves. Q.E.D.
Note.--The more this knowledge, that things are necessary, is
applied to particular things, which we conceive more distinctly
and vividly, the greater is the power of the mind over the
emotions, as experience also testifies. For we see, that the
pain arising from the loss of any good is mitigated, as soon as
the man who has lost it perceives, that it could not by any means
have been preserved. So also we see that no one pities an
infant, because it cannot speak, walk, or reason, or lastly,
because it passes so many years, as it were, in unconsciousness.
Whereas, if most people were born full--grown and only one here
and there as an infant, everyone would pity the infants; because
infancy would not then be looked on as a state natural and
necessary, but as a fault or delinquency in Nature; and we may
note several other instances of th
|