he body,
whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception.
Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence it follows that there is no emotion, whereof
we cannot form some clear and distinct conception. For an
emotion is the idea of a modification of the body (by the general
Def. of the Emotions), and must therefore (by the preceding
Prop.) involve some clear and distinct conception.

Note.--Seeing that there is nothing which is not followed by
an effect (I. xxxvi.), and that we clearly and distinctly
understand whatever follows from an idea, which in us is adequate
(II. xl.), it follows that everyone has the power of clearly and
distinctly understanding himself and his emotions, if not
absolutely, at any rate in part, and consequently of bringing it
about, that he should become less subject to them. To attain
this result, therefore, we must chiefly direct our efforts to
acquiring, as far as possible, a clear and distinct knowledge of
every emotion, in order that the mind may thus, through emotion,
be determined to think of those things which it clearly and
distinctly perceives, and wherein it fully acquiesces: and thus
that the emotion itself may be separated from the thought of an
external cause, and may be associated with true thoughts; whence
it will come to pass, not only that love, hatred, &c. will be
destroyed (V. ii.), but also that the appetites or desires, which
are wont to arise from such emotion, will become incapable of
being excessive (IV. lxi.). For it must be especially remarked,
that the appetite through which a man is said to be active, and
that through which he is said to be passive is one and the same.
For instance, we have shown that human nature is so constituted,
that everyone desires his fellow--men to live after his own
fashion (III. xxxi. note); in a man, who is not guided by
reason, this appetite is a passion which is called ambition, and
does not greatly differ from pride; whereas in a man, who lives
by the dictates of reason, it is an activity or virtue which is
called piety (IV. xxxvii. note. i. and second proof). In like
manner all appetites or desires are only passions, in so far as
they spring from inadequate ideas; the same results are
accredited to virtue, when they are aroused or generated by
adequate ideas. For all desires, whereby we are determined to
any given action, may arise as much from adequate as from
inadequate ideas (IV. lix.). Than this remedy for the emotions
(to return to