g advantage to man, or inflict injury upon
him.

PROP. LVIII. Honour (gloria) is not repugnant to reason, but may
arise therefrom.

Proof.--This is evident from Def. of the Emotions, xxx., and
also from the definition of an honourable man (IV. xxxvii. note.
i.).

Note--Empty honour, as it is styled, is self--approval,
fostered only by the good opinion of the populace; when this
good opinion ceases there ceases also the self--approval, in other
words, the highest object of each man's love (IV. lii. note);
consequently, he whose honour is rooted in popular approval must,
day by day, anxiously strive, act, and scheme in order to retain
his reputation. For the populace is variable and inconstant, so
that, if a reputation be not kept up, it quickly withers away.
Everyone wishes to catch popular applause for himself, and
readily represses the fame of others. The object of the strife
being estimated as the greatest of all goods, each combatant is
seized with a fierce desire to put down his rivals in every
possible way, till he who at last comes out victorious is more
proud of having done harm to others than of having done good to
himself. This sort of honour, then, is really empty, being
nothing.

The points to note concerning shame may easily be inferred
from what was said on the subject of mercy and repentance. I
will only add that shame, like compassion, though not a virtue,
is yet good, in so far as it shows, that the feeler of shame is
really imbued with the desire to live honourably; in the same
way as suffering is good, as showing that the injured part is not
mortified. Therefore, though a man who feels shame is sorrowful,
he is yet more perfect than he, who is shameless, and has no
desire to live honourably.

Such are the points which I undertook to remark upon
concerning the emotions of pleasure and pain; as for the
desires, they are good or bad according as they spring from good
or evil emotions. But all, in so far as they are engendered in
us by emotions wherein the mind is passive, are blind (as is
evident from what was said in IV. xliv. note), and would be
useless, if men could easily, be induced to live by the guidance
of reason only, as I will now briefly, show.

PROP. LIX. To all the actions, whereto we are determined by
emotion wherein the mind is passive; we can be determined
without emotion by reason.

Proof.--To act rationally, is nothing else (III. iii. and Def.
ii.) but to perform th