y the actions of men than the actions of beasts. But I
will treat of this more at length elsewhere.

PROP. XXXVI. The highest good of those who follow virtue is
common to all, and therefore all can equally rejoice therein.

Proof.--To act virtuously is to act in obedience with reason
(IV. xxiv.), and whatsoever we endeavour to do in obedience to
reason is to understand (IV. xxvi.); therefore (IV. xxviii.) the
highest good for those who follow after virtue is to know God;
that is (II. xlvii. and note) a good which is common to all and
can be possessed by all men equally, in so far as they are of
the same nature. Q.E.D.

Note.--Someone may ask how it would be, if the highest good of
those who follow after virtue were not common to all? Would it
not then follow, as above (IV. xxxiv.), that men living in
obedience to reason, that is (IV. xxxv.), men in so far as they
agree in nature, would be at variance one with another? To such
an inquiry, I make answer, that it follows not accidentally but
from the very nature of reason, that main's highest good is
common to all, inasmuch as it is deduced from the very essence of
man, in so far as defined by reason; and that a man could
neither be, nor be conceived without the power of taking pleasure
in this highest good. For it belongs to the essence of the human
mind (II. xlvii.), to have an adequate knowledge of the eternal
and infinite essence of God.

PROP. XXXVII. The good which every man, who follows after
virtue, desires for himself he will also desire for other men,
and so much the more, in proportion as he has a greater knowledge
of God.

Proof.--Men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason,
are most useful to their fellow men (IV. xxxv; Coroll. i.);
therefore (IV. xix.), we shall in obedience to reason necessarily
endeavour to bring about that men should live in obedience to
reason. But the good which every man, in so far as he is guided
by reason, or, in other words, follows after virtue, desires for
himself, is to understand (IV. xxvi.); wherefore the good, which
each follower of virtue seeks for himself, he will desire also
for others. Again, desire, in so far as it is referred to the
mind, is the very essence of the mind (Def. of the Emotions, i.);
now the essence of the mind consists in knowledge (II. xi.),
which involves the knowledge of God (II. xlvii.), and without it
(I. xv.), can neither be, nor be conceived; therefore, in
proportion as the m