tion of things rather than by his own
nature considered solely in itself.

[13] Honestas

Such are the matters which I engaged to prove in Prop. xviii.
of this Part, whereby it is plain that the law against the
slaughtering of animals is founded rather on vain superstition
and womanish pity than on sound reason. The rational quest of
what is useful to us further teaches us the necessity of
associating ourselves with our fellow men, but not with beasts,
or things, whose nature is different from our own; we have the
same rights in respect to them as they have in respect to us.
Nay, as everyone's right is defined by his virtue, or power, men
have far greater rights over beasts than beasts have over men.
Still I do not deny that beasts feel: what I deny is, that we
may not consult our own advantage and use them as we please,
treating them in the way which best suits us; for their nature
is not like ours, and their emotions are naturally different from
human emotions (III. lvii. note). It remains for me to explain
what I mean by just and unjust, sin and merit. On these points
see the following note.

Note II.--In the Appendix to Part I. I undertook to explain
praise and blame, merit and sin, justice and injustice.

Concerning praise and blame I have spoken in III. xxix. note:
the time has now come to treat of the remaining terms. But I
must first say a few words concerning man in the state of nature
and in society.

Every man exists by sovereign natural right, and,
consequently, by sovereign natural right performs those actions
which follow from the necessity of his own nature; therefore by
sovereign natural right every man judges what is good and what is
bad, takes care of his own advantage according to his own
disposition (IV. xix. and IV. xx.), avenges the wrongs done to
him (III. xl. Coroll. ii.), and endeavours to preserve that which
he loves and to destroy that which he hates (III. xxviii.). Now,
if men lived under the guidance of reason, everyone would remain
in possession of this his right, without any injury being done to
his neighbour (IV. xxxv. Coroll. i.). But seeing that they are a
prey to their emotions, which far surpass human power or virtue
(IV. vi.), they are often drawn in different directions, and
being at variance one with another (IV. xxxiii. xxxiv.), stand in
need of mutual help (IV. xxxv. note). Wherefore, in order that
men may live together in harmony, and may aid one another, it is