repentance, which we may thus define:

XXVII. Repentance is pain accompanied by the idea of some
action, which we believe we have performed by the free decision
of our mind.

Explanation--The causes of these emotions we have set forth in
III. li. note, and in III. liii., liv., lv. and note. Concerning
the free decision of the mind see II. xxxv. note. This is
perhaps the place to call attention to the fact, that it is
nothing wonderful that all those actions, which are commonly
called wrong, are followed by pain, and all those, which are
called right, are followed by pleasure. We can easily gather
from what has been said, that this depends in great measure on
education. Parents, by reprobating the former class of actions,
and by frequently chiding their children because of them, and
also by persuading to and praising the latter class, have brought
it about, that the former should be associated with pain and the
latter with pleasure. This is confirmed by experience. For
custom and religion are not the same among all men, but that
which some consider sacred others consider profane, and what some
consider honourable others consider disgraceful. According as
each man has been educated, he feels repentance for a given
action or glories therein.

XXVIII. Pride is thinking too highly of one's self from
self--love.

Explanation--Thus pride is different from partiality, for the
latter term is used in reference to an external object, but pride
is used of a man thinking too highly of himself. However, as
partiality is the effect of love, so is pride the effect or
property of self--love, which may therefore be thus defined, love
of self or self--approval, in so far as it leads a man to think
too highly of himself. To this emotion there is no contrary.
For no one thinks too meanly of himself because of self--hatred;
I say that no one thinks too meanly of himself, in so far as he
conceives that he is incapable of doing this or that. For
whatsoever a man imagines that he is incapable of doing, he
imagines this of necessity, and by that notion he is so disposed,
that he really cannot do that which he conceives that he cannot
do. For, so long as he conceives that he cannot do it, so long
is he not determined to do it, and consequently so long is it
impossible for him to do it. However, if we consider such
matters as only depend on opinion, we shall find it conceivable
that a man may think too meanly of himself; for