hich is nothing else
but the desire of anything, engendered in us by the fact that we
conceive that others have the like desire.

Corollary I.--If we conceive that anyone, whom we have
hitherto regarded with no emotion, pleasurably affects something
similar to ourselves, we shall be affected with love towards him.
If, on the other hand, we conceive that he painfully affects the
same, we shall be affected with hatred towards him.

Proof.--This is proved from the last proposition in the same
manner as III. xxii. is proved from III. xxi.

Corollary II.--We cannot hate a thing which we pity, because
its misery affects us painfully.

Proof.--If we could hate it for this reason, we should rejoice
in its pain, which is contrary to the hypothesis.

Corollary III.--We seek to free from misery, as far as we can,
a thing which we pity.

Proof.--That, which painfully affects the object of our pity,
affects us also with similar pain (by the foregoing proposition);
therefore, we shall endeavour to recall everything which
removes its existence, or which destroys it (cf. III. xiii.); in
other words (III. ix. note), we shall desire to destroy it, or we
shall be determined for its destruction; thus, we shall
endeavour to free from misery a thing which we pity. Q.E.D.

Note II.--This will or appetite for doing good, which arises
from pity of the thing whereon we would confer a benefit, is
called benevolence, and is nothing else but desire arising from
compassion. Concerning love or hate towards him who has done
good or harm to something, which we conceive to be like
ourselves, see III. xxii. note.

PROP. XXVIII. We endeavour to bring about whatsoever we conceive
to conduce to pleasure; but we endeavour to remove or destroy
whatsoever we conceive to be truly repugnant thereto, or to
conduce to pain.

Proof.--We endeavour, as far as possible, to conceive that
which we imagine to conduce to pleasure (III. xii.); in other
words (II. xvii.) we shall endeavour to conceive it as far as
possible as present or actually existing. But the endeavour of
the mind, or the mind's power of thought, is equal to, and
simultaneous with, the endeavour of the body, or the body's power
of action. (This is clear from II. vii. Coroll. and II. xi.
Coroll.). Therefore we make an absolute endeavour for its
existence, in other words (which by III. ix. note, come to the
same thing) we desire and strive for it; this was our first
point. Again, if