displaying the force both of his body and mind, and
also that, for this reason, men are troublesome to one another.
Again, it follows that men are naturally envious (III. xxiv.
note, and III. xxxii. note), rejoicing in the shortcomings of
their equals, and feeling pain at their virtues. For whenever a
man conceives his own actions, he is affected with pleasure (III.
liii.), in proportion as his actions display more perfection, and
he conceives them more distinctly--that is (II. xl. note), in
proportion as he can distinguish them from others, and regard
them as something special. Therefore, a man will take most
pleasure in contemplating himself, when he contemplates some
quality which he denies to others. But, if that which he affirms
of himself be attributable to the idea of man or animals in
general, he will not be so greatly pleased: he will, on the
contrary, feel pain, if he conceives that his own actions fall
short when compared with those of others. This pain (III.
xxviii.) he will endeavour to remove, by putting a wrong
construction on the actions of his equals, or by, as far as he
can, embellishing his own.

It is thus apparent that men are naturally prone to hatred
and envy, which latter is fostered by their education. For
parents are accustomed to incite their children to virtue solely
by the spur of honour and envy. But, perhaps, some will scruple
to assent to what I have said, because we not seldom admire men's
virtues, and venerate their possessors. In order to remove such
doubts, I append the following corollary.

Corollary.--No one envies the virtue of anyone who is not his
equal.

Proof.--Envy is a species of hatred (III. xxiv. note) or (III.
xiii. note) pain, that is (III. xi. note), a modification whereby
a man's power of activity, or endeavour towards activity, is
checked. But a man does not endeavour or desire to do anything,
which cannot follow from his nature as it is given; therefore a
man will not desire any power of activity or virtue (which is the
same thing) to be attributed to him, that is appropriate to
another's nature and foreign to his own; hence his desire cannot
be checked, nor he himself pained by the contemplation of virtue
in some one unlike himself, consequently he cannot envy such an
one. But he can envy his equal, who is assumed to have the same
nature as himself. Q.E.D.

Note.--When, therefore, as we said in the note to III. lii.,
we venerate a man, through wonde