we conceive that something, which we believed
to be the cause of pain, that is (III. xiii. note), which we
hate, is destroyed, we shall rejoice (III. xx.). We shall,
therefore (by the first part of this proof), endeavour to destroy
the same, or (III. xiii.) to remove it from us, so that we may
not regard it as present; this was our second point. Wherefore
whatsoever conduces to pleasure, &c. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXIX. We shall also endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive
men[6] to regard with pleasure, and contrariwise we shall shrink
from doing that which we conceive men to shrink from.

[6] By "men" in this and the following propositions, I mean men
whom we regard without any particular emotion.

Proof.--From the fact of imagining, that men love or hate
anything, we shall love or hate the same thing (III. xxvii.).
That is (III. xiii. note), from this mere fact we shall feel
pleasure or pain at the thing's presence. And so we shall
endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive men to love or regard with
pleasure, etc. Q.E.D.

Note.--This endeavour to do a thing or leave it undone, solely
in order to please men, we call ambition, especially when we so
eagerly endeavour to please the vulgar, that we do or omit
certain things to our own or another's hurt: in other cases it
is generally called kindliness. Furthermore I give the name of
praise to the pleasure, with which we conceive the action of
another, whereby he has endeavoured to please us; but of blame
to the pain wherewith we feel aversion to his action.

PROP. XXX. If anyone has done something which he conceives as
affecting other men pleasurably, he will be affected by pleasure,
accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in other words, he
will regard himself with pleasure. On the other hand, if he has
done anything which he conceives as affecting others painfully,
he will regard himself with pain.

Proof.--He who conceives, that he affects others with pleasure
or pain, will, by that very fact, himself be affected with
pleasure or pain (III. xxvii.), but, as a man (II. xix. and
xxiii.) is conscious of himself through the modifications whereby
he is determined to action, it follows that he who conceives,
that he affects others pleasurably, will be affected with
pleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in other
words, he will regard himself with pleasure. And so mutatis
mutandis in the case of pain. Q.E.D.

Note.--As love (III. xiii.) is pleas