have been greater in the object of love. This was our first
point. Further, in so far as a thing is affected with pain, it
is to that extent destroyed, the extent being in proportion to
the amount of pain (III. xi. note); therefore (III. xix.) he who
conceives, that the object of his love is affected painfully,
will himself be affected painfully, in proportion as the said
emotion is greater or less in the object of love. Q.E.D.
PROP. XXII. If we conceive that anything pleasurably affects
some object of our love, we shall be affected with love towards
that thing. Contrariwise, if we conceive that it affects an
object of our love painfully, we shall be affected with hatred
towards it.
Proof.--He, who affects pleasurably or painfully the object of
our love, affects us also pleasurably or painfully--that is, if we
conceive the loved object as affected with the said pleasure or
pain (III. xxi.). But this pleasure or pain is postulated to come
to us accompanied by the idea of an external cause; therefore
(III. xiii. note), if we conceive that anyone affects an object
of our love pleasurably or painfully, we shall be affected with
love or hatred towards him. Q.E.D.
Note.--Prop. xxi. explains to us the nature of Pity, which we
may define as pain arising from another's hurt. What term we can
use for pleasure arising from another's gain, I know not.
We will call the love towards him who confers a benefit on
another, Approval; and the hatred towards him who injures
another, we will call Indignation. We must further remark, that
we not only feel pity for a thing which we have loved (as shown
in III. xxi.), but also for a thing which we have hitherto
regarded without emotion, provided that we deem that it resembles
ourselves (as I will show presently). Thus, we bestow approval
on one who has benefited anything resembling ourselves, and,
contrariwise, are indignant with him who has done it an injury.
PROP. XXIII. He who conceives, that an object of his hatred is
painfully affected, will feel pleasure. Contrariwise, if he
thinks that the said object is pleasurably affected, he will feel
pain. Each of these emotions will be greater or less, according
as its contrary is greater or less in the object of hatred.
Proof.--In so far as an object of hatred is painfully
affected, it is destroyed, to an extent proportioned to the
strength of the pain (III. xi. note). Therefore, he (III. xx.)
who conceives, that some
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