nature and
properties of the human mind at sufficient length, and,
considering the difficulty of the subject, with sufficient
clearness. I have laid a foundation, whereon may be raised many
excellent conclusions of the highest utility and most necessary
to be known, as will, in what follows, be partly made plain.
PART III.
ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS
Most writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem to be
treating rather of matters outside nature than of natural
phenomena following nature's general laws. They appear to
conceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a
kingdom: for they believe that he disturbs rather than follows
nature's order, that he has absolute control over his actions,
and that he is determined solely by himself. They attribute
human infirmities and fickleness, not to the power of nature in
general, but to some mysterious flaw in the nature of man, which
accordingly they bemoan, deride, despise, or, as usually happens,
abuse: he, who succeeds in hitting off the weakness of the human
mind more eloquently or more acutely than his fellows, is looked
upon as a seer. Still there has been no lack of very excellent
men (to whose toil and industry I confess myself much indebted),
who have written many noteworthy things concerning the right way
of life, and have given much sage advice to mankind. But no one,
so far as I know, has defined the nature and strength of the
emotions, and the power of the mind against them for their
restraint.
I do not forget, that the illustrious Descartes, though he
believed, that the mind has absolute power over its actions,
strove to explain human emotions by their primary causes, and, at
the same time, to point out a way, by which the mind might attain
to absolute dominion over them. However, in my opinion, he
accomplishes nothing beyond a display of the acuteness of his own
great intellect, as I will show in the proper place. For the
present I wish to revert to those, who would rather abuse or
deride human emotions than understand them. Such persons will,
doubtless think it strange that I should attempt to treat of
human vice and folly geometrically, and should wish to set forth
with rigid reasoning those matters which they cry out against as
repugnant to reason, frivolous, absurd, and dreadful. However,
such is my plan. Nothing comes to pass in nature, which can be
set down to a flaw therein; for nature is always
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