ted that experience seems to teach us
especially clearly, that we are able to suspend our judgment
before assenting to things which we perceive; this is confirmed
by the fact that no one is said to be deceived, in so far as he
perceives anything, but only in so far as he assents or dissents.

For instance, he who feigns a winged horse, does not
therefore admit that a winged horse exists; that is, he is not
deceived, unless he admits in addition that a winged horse does
exist. Nothing therefore seems to be taught more clearly by
experience, than that the will or faculty of assent is free and
different from the faculty of understanding. Thirdly, it may be
objected that one affirmation does not apparently contain more
reality than another; in other words, that we do not seem to
need for affirming, that what is true is true, any greater power
than for affirming, that what is false is true. We have,
however, seen that one idea has more reality or perfection than
another, for as objects are some more excellent than others, so
also are the ideas of them some more excellent than others; this
also seems to point to a difference between the understanding and
the will. Fourthly, it may be objected, if man does not act from
free will, what will happen if the incentives to action are
equally balanced, as in the case of Buridan's ass? Will he
perish of hunger and thirst? If I say that he would, I shall
seem to have in my thoughts an ass or the statue of a man rather
than an actual man. If I say that he would not, he would then
determine his own action, and would consequently possess the
faculty of going and doing whatever he liked. Other objections
might also be raised, but, as I am not bound to put in evidence
everything that anyone may dream, I will only set myself to the
task of refuting those I have mentioned, and that as briefly as
possible.

To the first objection I answer, that I admit that the will
has a wider scope than the understanding, if by the understanding
be meant only clear and distinct ideas; but I deny that the will
has a wider scope than the perceptions, and the faculty of
forming conceptions; nor do I see why the faculty of volition
should be called infinite, any more than the faculty of feeling:
for, as we are able by the same faculty of volition to affirm an
infinite number of things (one after the other, for we cannot
affirm an infinite number simultaneously), so also can we, by the
same faculty o