and
external bodies (II. xvi. Coroll. i. and II. xvii.) as actually
existing; therefore (II. xlv. and xlvi.) it has an adequate
knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God. Q.E.D.
Note.--Hence we see, that the infinite essence and the
eternity of God are known to all. Now as all things are in God,
and are conceived through God, we can from this knowledge infer
many things, which we may adequately know, and we may form that
third kind of knowledge of which we spoke in the note to II. xl.,
and of the excellence and use of which we shall have occasion to
speak in Part V. Men have not so clear a knowledge of God as
they have of general notions, because they are unable to imagine
God as they do bodies, and also because they have associated the
name God with images of things that they are in the habit of
seeing, as indeed they can hardly avoid doing, being, as they
are, men, and continually affected by external bodies. Many
errors, in truth, can be traced to this head, namely, that we do
not apply names to things rightly. For instance, when a man says
that the lines drawn from the centre of a circle to its
circumference are not equal, he then, at all events, assuredly
attaches a meaning to the word circle different from that
assigned by mathematicians. So again, when men make mistakes in
calculation, they have one set of figures in their mind, and
another on the paper. If we could see into their minds, they do
not make a mistake; they seem to do so, because we think, that
they have the same numbers in their mind as they have on the
paper. If this were not so, we should not believe them to be in
error, any more than I thought that a man was in error, whom I
lately heard exclaiming that his entrance hall had flown into a
neighbour's hen, for his meaning seemed to me sufficiently clear.
Very many controversies have arisen from the fact, that men do
not rightly explain their meaning, or do not rightly interpret
the meaning of others. For, as a matter of fact, as they flatly
contradict themselves, they assume now one side, now another, of
the argument, so as to oppose the opinions, which they consider
mistaken and absurd in their opponents.
PROP. XLVIII. In the mind there is no absolute or free will;
but the mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause, which
has also been determined by another cause, and this last by
another cause, and so on to infinity.
Proof.--The mind is a fixed and definite m
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