in two books,
which in a Latinised form we still fortunately possess,--the first two
of Cicero's work _de Officiis_,--and without the uncompromising rigidity
which characterised the original Stoic ethical doctrine inherited from
the Cynics.[795] In the first book he treated of the good simply
(_honestum_), in the second of the useful (_utile_), and in a third,
which it was left for Cicero to execute, of the cases of conflict
between these two. In this charming work there is much to admire, and
even much to learn: the social virtues--benevolence, justice,
liberality, self-restraint, and so on, are enlarged upon and illustrated
by historical examples[796] in perfect Latin by Cicero; and as we read
it we cannot but feel that the influence of Panaetius upon his educated
Roman pupils must have been eminently wholesome.

But at the same time we inevitably feel that there is something wanting.
What power could such a discussion really have to constrain an ordinary
man to right action? The constraint, such as it is, seems purely an
intellectual process, and this is indeed noticeable in the Stoic ethics
of all periods. No Stoic brought his doctrine nearer to a religious
system than Epictetus; yet this is how Epictetus puts the matter:[797]
"If a man could be thoroughly penetrated, as he ought to be, with this
_thought_, that we are all in an especial manner sprung from God, and
that God is the Father of men as well as gods, full sure he would never
conceive aught ignoble or base of himself.... Those few who _hold_ that
they are born for fidelity, modesty, and unerring rightness in dealing
with the things of sense, never conceive aught base or ignoble of
themselves." He means that, for the real Stoic, _self-respect is the
necessary consequence of his intellectual conception of his place in the
universe_, and that self-respect must as inevitably result in virtue.
Can this intellectual attitude really act as a constraining force on the
will of the average man? This is far too complicated a question for me
to enter upon here, and I can but suggest the study of it for anyone who
would wish to test the actual life-giving moral power of this
philosophy. Suffice it to say that their idea of the universe as Reason
and God naturally led the Stoics into a kind of Fatalism, a destined
order in the world which nothing could effectually oppose;[798] and they
were naturally in some difficulty in reconciling this with the freedom
of Man's will