nnexion in which the word
'not' stands with the action expressed by the verb 'is to be
killed'--which action is naturally established[83]--be used as a reason
for assuming that 'not' denotes an action non-established elsewhere[84],
different from the state of mere passivity implied in the abstinence
from the act of killing. For the peculiar function of the particle 'not'
is to intimate the idea of the non-existence of that with which it is
connected, and the conception of the non-existence (of something to be
done) is the cause of the state of passivity. (Nor can it be objected
that, as soon as that momentary idea has passed away, the state of
passivity will again make room for activity; for) that idea itself
passes away (only after having completely destroyed the natural impulse
prompting to the murder of a Brahma/n/a, &c., just as a fire is
extinguished only after having completely consumed its fuel). Hence we
are of opinion that the aim of prohibitory passages, such as 'a
Brahma/n/a is not to be killed,' is a merely passive state, consisting
in the abstinence from some possible action; excepting some special
cases, such as the so-called Prajapati-vow, &c.[85] Hence the charge of
want of purpose is to be considered as referring (not to the
Vedanta-passages, but only) to such statements about existent things as
are of the nature of legends and the like, and do not serve any purpose
of man.

The allegation that a mere statement about an actually existent thing
not connected with an injunction of something to be done, is purposeless
(as, for instance, the statement that the earth contains seven dvipas)
has already been refuted on the ground that a purpose is seen to exist
in some such statements, as, for instance, 'this is not a snake, but a
rope.'--But how about the objection raised above that the information
about Brahman cannot be held to have a purpose in the same way as the
statement about a rope has one, because a man even after having heard
about Brahman continues to belong to this transmigratory world?--We
reply as follows: It is impossible to show that a man who has once
understood Brahman to be the Self, belongs to the transmigratory world
in the same sense as he did before, because that would be contrary to
the fact of his being Brahman. For we indeed observe that a person who
imagines the body, and so on, to constitute the Self, is subject to fear
and pain, but we have no right to assume that the same person