s not constitute a
complement to anything else. Of that soul which is to be comprehended
from the Upanishads only, which is non-transmigratory, Brahman,
different in nature from the four classes of substances[79], which forms
a topic of its own and is not a complement to anything else; of that
soul it is impossible to say that it is not or is not apprehended; for
the passage, 'That Self is to be described by No, no!' (B/ri/. Up. III,
9, 26) designates it as the Self, and that the Self is cannot be denied.
The possible objection that there is no reason to maintain that the soul
is known from the Upanishads only, since it is the object of
self-consciousness, is refuted by the fact that the soul of which the
Upanishads treat is merely the witness of that (i.e. of the object of
self-consciousness, viz. the jivatman). For neither from that part of
the Veda which enjoins works nor from reasoning, anybody apprehends that
soul which, different from the agent that is the object of
self-consciousness, merely witnesses it; which is permanent in all
(transitory) beings; uniform; one; eternally unchanging; the Self of
everything. Hence it can neither be denied nor be represented as the
mere complement of injunctions; for of that very person who might deny
it it is the Self. And as it is the Self of all, it can neither be
striven after nor avoided. All perishable things indeed perish, because
they are mere modifications, up to (i.e. exclusive of) the soul. But the
soul is imperishable[80], as there is no cause why it should perish; and
eternally unchanging, as there is no cause for its undergoing any
modification; hence it is in its essence eternally pure and free. And
from passages, such as 'Beyond the soul there is nothing; this is the
goal, the highest road' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 11), and 'That soul, taught in
the Upanishads, I ask thee' (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 26), it appears that the
attribute of resting on the Upanishads is properly given to the soul, as
it constitutes their chief topic. To say, therefore, that there is no
portion of the Veda referring to existing things, is a mere bold
assertion.
With regard to the quotations made of the views of men acquainted with
the purport of the /S/astra (who alone were stated to have declared that
the Veda treats of actions) it is to be understood that they, having to
do with the enquiry into duty, refer to that part of the /S/astra which
consists of injunctions and prohibitions. With regard to t
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