FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   1257   1258   1259   1260   1261   1262   1263   1264   1265   1266   1267   1268   1269   1270   1271   1272   1273   1274   1275   1276   1277   1278   1279   1280   1281  
1282   1283   1284   1285   1286   1287   1288   1289   1290   1291   1292   1293   1294   1295   1296   1297   1298   1299   1300   1301   1302   1303   1304   1305   1306   >>   >|  
a public use' rests upon historical error. In my opinion the true principle is that the State's power extends to every regulation of any business reasonably required and appropriate for the public protection. I find in the due process clause no other limitation upon the character or the scope of regulation permissible." [185] Justice McReynolds, speaking for the dissenting Justices, labelled the controls imposed by the challenged statute as a "fanciful scheme to protect the farmer against undue exactions by prescribing the price at which milk disposed of by him at will may be resold." Intimating that the New York statute was as efficacious as a safety regulation which required "householders to pour oil on their roofs as a means of curbing the spread of a neighborhood fire," Justice McReynolds insisted that "this Court must have regard to the wisdom of the enactment," and must determine "whether the means proposed have reasonable relation to something within legislative power."--291 U.S. 502, 556, 558 (1934). [186] 313 U.S. 236, 246 (1941). [187] 277 U.S. 350 (1928). [188] 94 U.S. 113 (1877). _See also_ Peik _v._ Chicago & N.W.R. Co., 94 U.S. 164 (1877). [189] Rate-making is deemed to be one species of price fixing. Power Comm'n _v._ Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 603 (1942). [190] Nebbia _v._ New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). [191] 96 U.S. 97 (1878). _See also_ Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. _v._ Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). [192] 116 U.S. 307 (1886). [193] Dow _v._ Beidelman, 125 U.S. 680 (1888). [194] 134 U.S. 418, 458 (1890). [195] 143 U.S. 517 (1892). [196] 154 U.S. 362, 397 (1894). [197] Ibid 397. Insofar as judicial intervention resulting in the invalidation of legislatively imposed rates has involved carriers, it should be noted that the successful complainant invariably has been the carrier, not the shipper. [198] 169 U.S. 466 (1898).--Of course the validity of rates prescribed by a State for services wholly within its limits, must be determined wholly without reference to the interstate business done by a public utility. Domestic business should not be made to bear the losses on interstate business, and vice versa. Thus a State has no power to require the hauling of logs at a loss or at rates that are unreasonable, even if a railroad receives adequate revenues from the intrastate long haul and the interstate lumber haul taken together. On the other hand, in determining whether intrastate pa
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   1257   1258   1259   1260   1261   1262   1263   1264   1265   1266   1267   1268   1269   1270   1271   1272   1273   1274   1275   1276   1277   1278   1279   1280   1281  
1282   1283   1284   1285   1286   1287   1288   1289   1290   1291   1292   1293   1294   1295   1296   1297   1298   1299   1300   1301   1302   1303   1304   1305   1306   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

business

 

regulation

 
interstate
 

Chicago

 

public

 

statute

 

wholly

 
intrastate
 

imposed

 

Justice


McReynolds

 

required

 

judicial

 

intervention

 
Insofar
 

resulting

 

legislatively

 

successful

 

complainant

 

invariably


carriers

 

opinion

 
involved
 
invalidation
 
Beidelman
 

unreasonable

 
railroad
 

receives

 
require
 
hauling

adequate
 

revenues

 
determining
 
lumber
 

validity

 

prescribed

 
services
 
shipper
 

historical

 
Domestic

losses

 

utility

 

limits

 

determined

 

reference

 

carrier

 
curbing
 

spread

 
neighborhood
 

limitation