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U.S. 379 (1924). [156] New York C.R. Co. _v._ Bianc, 250 U.S. 596 (1919).--Attorneys are not deprived of property or their liberty of contract by restriction imposed by the State on the fees which they may charge in cases arising under the workmen's compensation law.--Yeiser _v._ Dysart, 267 U.S. 540 (1925). [157] Justice Black in Lincoln Union _v._ Northwestern Co., 335 U.S. 525, 535 (1949). _See also_ pp. 141, 977-979, 985. In his concurring opinion, contained in the companion case of American Federation of Labor _v._ American Sash Co., 335 U.S. 538, 543-544 (1949), Justice Frankfurter summarized as follows the now obsolete doctrines employed by the Court to strike down State laws fostering unionization. "* * * unionization encountered the shibboleths of a premachine age and these were reflected in juridical assumptions that survived the facts on which they were based. Adam Smith was treated as though his generalizations had been imparted to him on Sinai and not as a thinker who addressed himself to the elimination of restrictions which had become fetters upon initiative and enterprise in his day. Basic human rights expressed by the constitutional conception of 'liberty' were equated with theories of _laissez faire_. The result was that economic views of confined validity were treated by lawyers and judges as though the Framers had enshrined them in the Constitution. * * * The attitude which regarded any legislative encroachment upon the existing economic order as infected with unconstitutionality led to disrespect for legislative attempts to strengthen the wage-earners' bargaining power. With that attitude as a premise, Adair _v._ United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), and Coppage _v._ Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), followed logically enough; not even Truax _v._ Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921), could be considered unexpected." On grounds of unconstitutional impairment of freedom of contract, or more particularly, of the unrestricted right of the employer to hire and fire, a federal and a State statute attempting to outlaw "yellow dog" contracts whereby, as a condition of obtaining employment, a worker had to agree not to join or to remain a member of a union, were voided in Adair _v._ United States and Coppage _v._ Kansas, respectively. In Truax _v._ Corrigan, a majority of the Court held that an Arizona statute which operated, in effect, to make remediless [by forbidding the use of injunction] injury to an employer'
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