affairs on the Eastern Front and in
the Near East became transformed owing to the Russian _debacle_--a
_debacle_ which turned out to be considerably greater than the
available information as to our Ally's munition difficulties had led
us to anticipate.
It is easy to say now, after the event, that we ought to have come
away from the Dardanelles in June, and to have transferred the force
there, or part of it, to Serbia, which was obviously placed in peril
by Russia's collapse. But in June reinforcements were already
earmarked for the Gallipoli Peninsula, and Sir I. Hamilton was
confident of achieving a substantial success after they should arrive.
It is easy to say now, after the event, that, immediately the
offensive from Anzac and Suvla in August miscarried, we ought to have
come out of the Gallipoli Peninsula and to have transferred the force
there, or some of it, to Serbia. But in the latter part of August the
French were disposed to send a substantial contingent to the Asiatic
side of the Straits, we were supposed to have troops to spare for that
part of the world, and it was not until early September that all this
was dropped in view of events on the Western Front. It is easy to say
now, after the event, that the Entente ought to have foreseen that
King Constantine would throw Serbia over in any case, and that
therefore we ought not to have prevented the Serbs from attacking
Bulgaria while she was still mobilizing. But we trusted a King's word,
and we knew that M. Venizelos was heart and soul on our side. It is
easy to say now that we ought to have insisted on Serbia buying off
Bulgar hostility by handing over Macedonia. But Serbia might have
refused despite our insisting, and, when all is said and done, Serbia
has succeeded in keeping Macedonia after all. Ought we to have come
out of the Dardanelles in September, as soon as it was decided that
neither the French nor British would send reinforcements thither, and
to have transferred the troops to Salonika? Assuredly we ought then to
have come away from the Gallipoli Peninsula. But the evacuation must
have been a ticklish business, and to have aggravated its difficulties
by despatching its war-worn garrison simultaneously to Salonika and
Serbia, just when great enemy contingents were gathering on the Danube
and the Save, would have thrown a tremendous strain upon staff, upon
troops, and upon the shipping resources of all kinds actually on the
spot.
No. Leaving
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